

*From philosophy of mind to personality disorder*

# The Embodied Mind

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# Two mind-body problems

- Descartes: how is mental causation possible?
- Interactionism *vs* two-aspect theory
- Conceptual dualism. The neural correlate of an experience. Cf software and its hardware correlate
- Neither psychoanalysis nor cognitive therapy has to bother about the classical mind-body problem
- The challenge from modern neuropsychology of action: Libet on timing of actions and decisions
- The light-choice experiment. Aspect dualism and the idea of a neural correlate does not help us here

# The embodied mind

- So, is it an illusion that I initiate my actions?
- The solution: *I am not only my consciousness*
- Freud: The Ego is partly unconscious
- What is the nature of this unconscious?
- *Practical knowledge*: to walk, or to ski downhill
- Practical knowledge cannot be made fully conscious
- Merleau-Ponty: *body schema* and *lived body*
- Action dispositions with an emotional aspect
- Other people: the boxer, the lover, and the communication of emotions in music

# Cognitive therapy and embodiment

- CT: the mind is rational and transparent to itself
- The unconscious is seen only as a latent version of the conscious (Freud's *preconscious*).
- For Freud, therapy is anchored in the spontaneous emotional communication with the therapist
- While in CT, emotions are supposed to be modifiable by means of conscious reasoning
- Although CT undeniably works in emotional disorders, cognitive theory has not solved the problem of embodiment in a satisfactory way
- Is there a dissociation between theory and practice?