

Kvantifikator för en Dag

Essays dedicated to Dag Westerståhl on his sixtieth birthday



From scepticism to metaphysical naturalism

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1. Introduction

Traditionally, it has been assumed that experiences cannot, at least not exclusively, be studied by empirical means from a third-person perspective. On this view, information about experience is directly accessible only from within the mind having the experience, that is, from a first-person perspective. Thought, affection, emotion, perception, sensation, and so on, are all examples of supposedly conscious mental states. On a strong version of this view, the one of relevance for the discussion here, conscious states are epistemically transparent: If a mental state *X* of a certain type *T* (could be a sensation or a state of belief, or a feeling, etc depending on your theory of what is given) of a person *P* is conscious, then *P* knows that she is in a state *X* of type *T*. On this notion of the given there is no space for epistemic mistakes. Moreover, this direct route, through consciousness to information about mental states, is thought to be essentially private. Conversely, what happens in the external world is only indirectly and a posteriori knowable, if knowable at all. What happens in other minds is likewise, at most, indirectly and fallibly knowable. In other words, on a position committed to a strong notion of the given, which is combined with some notion of knowledge about what is not given, the information involved in the latter case is fallibly and publicly accessible from a third-person perspective.

This first/third-person distinction with respect to epistemic access can be turned into an argument for scepticism with respect to the justifiability of our beliefs in the existence of all kinds of objects to which the access is not direct. Section 2 presents an argument for this kind of scepticism. Section 3 shows how realism about the external world can seek justification in the explanatory virtues of the natural sciences. This realist argument cites the

external world in an inference to best (scientific) explanation of experience. The version of scepticism under discussion refuses to accept anything except for what is immediately given or logically or inductively inferred from that. I argue that all existing notions of the given are theoretically motivated, that is, they are not given. If that is true, it can be shown that the sceptic has to face a certain dilemma. Moreover, it is indicated how the adoption of the inference rule ‘from best explanation’ in this context represents the first step towards methodological naturalism. Section 4 and 5 are concerned with how to fit mental causation into a world view presupposing the completeness of physics. By citing the explanatory virtues of the natural sciences in a realist rejection of scepticism some (alleged) problems are solved but others obtain, as long as the ontological dichotomy between the physical and the mental is upheld. Some philosophers think that these ‘new’ problems are best explained on the assumption that the mental is physical. Again, the reference to best scientific explanation is at centre. This exemplifies one route from scepticism to reductive naturalism by way of, what could be called, ‘naturalistic dualism’.

2. The sceptic challenge

Scepticism comes in two forms, epistemological and ontological. As these labels indicate, the former denies the possibility to gain knowledge in some area, whereas the latter denies the existence of certain categories. What is under discussion here is a combination, the argument for which could be the following. (cf. Ayer, 1973 pp. 58-67, for a similar reconstruction of a central argument for scepticism) Assume that we have direct and infallible knowledge only of what is given, as described in the preceding paragraph. Assume that objects as they appear in experience are not external world objects, that is, naïve realism is false. On these assumptions, a realist with respect to external world knowledge must assume that we have indirect fallible knowledge in this area, mediated by what is given in experience. In general, how could the realist motivate the claim that she has knowledge about an external world, and more specifically that she knows that such a world exists? Presumably, from what is given in experience certain things can be logically inferred. For example, from ‘I have a red triangle experience’ I can infer ‘I have a triangle experience’. From past experiences, if accepting experience based empirical generalizations,

we can 'induce' knowledge about future experiences. For example, the following seems to be a useful empirical generalisation, 'most experiences of hunger are followed by a desire to eat'. The sceptic argument under discussion is based on the assumption that except for what is given in experience the only rational ways to acquire knowledge make use of logical inference or empirical generalization based on what is given. Accepting this as a starting point, the realist about external world knowledge, specifically as to its existence, has the following problem. On assumption beliefs in the existence of an external world are not justified by being given in experience. To set up an argument, logical or inductive, for the existence of an external world, premises concerning the external world are required. However, the truths of these premises are not given, since they refer to the external world, which is not given. Therefore, we have no rational reason to accept the premises required to induce or logically infer the existence of an external world. Any external world argument would have to include unwarranted premises about the external world. Since there are no further rational inference patterns (on assumption) it is concluded that no rational argument can be given to support the belief that there is an external world. This argument shows that it is irrational to believe in the existence of an external world, whereas full blown ontological scepticism, arguably, entails that it is rational to believe in its non-existence. I will not discuss this subtlety. Finally, along the same lines it is questioned that our beliefs in other minds are warranted, etc.

3. From scepticism to methodological naturalism

To refute scepticism you can make different moves. You can become a naïve realist. You can deny the premise that we have direct and infallible knowledge of anything, like those following Quine, taking a non-foundationalist stance toward epistemic justification, letting justification become theory internal business or something pragmatic in nature. A further alternative, reasonably realist in spirit, is to postulate certain relations of influence between the mind and the world. Notice that the idea of psycho-physical causation is old and it is not necessarily combined with reductive naturalism, that is, the view that the mental is somehow reducible to the physical. Descartes, for example, localises a causal nexus between the mental and the physical in the brain (pineal gland). Another example is

Brentano (1995), who defined the mental exclusively in terms of intentionality, a primitive mental property. On his view, when we perceive the physical world, we have immediate and infallible access to phenomenal objects as they are presented before the conscious mind (ibid 89). Physical phenomena are intentional objects, not real objects. To this Brentano adds the assumption that there is an external world (ibid. pp. 98-100) which is isomorphic to the phenomenal world as it appears in veridical perception. Moreover, veridical perception takes place only when the sensation stands in the right causal relation to the external world. By this *theoretical* move Brentano can stipulate notions of veridical perception, external world knowledge, etc. Russell (1927)¹ held a similar view as to the external world being causally related, and isomorphic, to the phenomenal world. Russell's argument could be viewed as an argument from best explanation. Assume that external events of which we are not directly acquainted cause mind events (percepts) of which we are directly acquainted. Assume also that similar effects have similar causes, that is, there is a one-to-one correspondence between external events and perceptual events. Then, Russell thought, we can *explain* external world knowledge in terms of structural similarity between percepts and external events. Russell explicitly claims that it couldn't be demonstrated that percepts corresponds to external causes. It is clear that he found the causal correspondence assumption reasonable because of its explanatory virtues. Russell's notions of percepts and immediate acquaintance aren't exactly the same as Brentano's concepts of intentionality and perception. It is important to notice that these are different notions of the given, theoretically speaking. The similarity is the underlying idea that a relevant causal connection (if holding) would explain how we could reliably but fallibly form beliefs about external objects, by way of fallible but reliable perception. Also, it causally explains why sensations (or sense data) appear to behave in such a systematic way.

¹ Newman (1928) demonstrated the weakness of the notion of structural similarity in this context. As a result from logic, to know of two sets of objects that they satisfy the same structure equals to know that they have the same number of elements. After Newman's publication, Russell wrote him a letter accepting his critique, saying that the idea of structural similarity is not enough to explain external world knowledge. However, the point of interest here is the structure of Russell's argument, not the viability of the structural similarity hypothesis.

Obviously, a die-hard sceptic finds no progress in this move since the existence of external objects and other minds aren't proved or even made probable with reference to any legitimate inference pattern. It is just more of the same unsound speculation. The thing is that a less sceptically inclined philosopher is interested in what would be a good explanation of our knowledge of the external world /other minds, in case such knowledge exists. If such a philosopher finds such an explanation she thinks: 'Fine, then my belief that I know things about the world is explained if true. Since what seems to be the paradigm of knowledge, namely scientific knowledge about the external world, is accepted because of virtues as explanatory and predictive power, the causal connection solution is scientifically motivated. It uniformly explains the appearance of an external world and of other minds, but also the regularity by which phenomena occur within appearance. It is a theory about the mental the physical, and psycho-physical connections.

What has the sceptic to say about explanatory relevance and power? We all know that you could opt for phenomenalism, as did Hume and certain logical positivists, and become an empiricist sceptic about the external world. Still, what is then missing is an explanation of knowledge. The sceptic denies that external world knowledge has to be explained, since she finds no reason in the first place to believe in its existence. To my mind this is twisted. *Prima facie* there is an external world. At least, that is how things appear to any normal mind; even to the sceptic I would say. I want to emphasize two points, which are related to this simple observation.

First, to explain the world you have to postulate something beyond what (you assume) is given. Either you go for the world or you go for not immediately given properties of something else, e.g., the mind. Both ways obviously transcend what is given, since what is (taken as) given is what you try to explain and predict. If you are not interested in explanations but only in predictive equations, as it were, then skip the model and stay sceptic about other minds and external objects. The question is on what grounds the sceptic should consider her equations reliable. Why stop being sceptic at the level of sequences of the given (impressions or sense data, etc) repeating themselves in certain manners? Either you postulate that you are epistemically locked up inside your own experiences, or you postulate an external world to explain those experiences. You could say that the choice is a

matter of taste in the end. Granting that, are we thereby accepting that there is no fact of the matter concerning the existence of an external world and connected issues of truth and knowledge? Should we conclude that pragmatic or instrumental notions of truth and reality seem to be on the right track? I would argue (Almér forthcoming) that the pragmatic factor (consisting of adopting a standard of explanatory virtues), which perhaps is necessarily involved in any decision to embrace a theoretical perspective, does not force us to discard realist conceptions of truth, or of a theory independent external reality.

Second, as mentioned above, to arrive at Brentano's notion of what is immediately given in presentation, or Russell's notion of direct acquaintance with sense data, you have to make certain theoretical assumptions. Arguably, this point generalizes to any notion of the given. You could appeal to certain intuitions to defend your notion of the given, but whose intuitions are to be counted? For example, my intuition tells me that quite extreme powers of imagination are required to invent and to accept external world scepticism. This is not by itself an argument against the sceptic, but certainly an indication that the very notion of immediate knowledge is not itself immediately and infallibly presented to every mind. If this should indicate that any notion of an immediate given is necessarily theoretically motivated, then the sceptic argument could be turned against the sceptic. The sceptic would have to appeal to explanatory virtues, hence transcending logical inference and induction to get of the ground. If so, the sceptic cannot consistently deny the realist to make inferences to the best explanation by way of rejecting the assumption that explanatory virtues have epistemic relevance. Let me describe this as the sceptic's dilemma. The sceptic has two alternatives, a) and b):

- a) The notion of what is given is theoretically motivated. In case it is stipulated as a primitive in your theory, it is theoretically motivated outside that theory.
- b) The notion of what is given is primitive, and what is more important, it is not theoretically motivated. It is immediately given, as it were.

If the sceptic accepts a) she has to motivate her theoretical assumptions in one way or another. She could either go beyond what is given according to her own notion of the given, or she could use her notion of the given and show that on that notion her notion is well

motivated, perhaps even self-evident. The first alternative will undermine her strategy to refute realism, that is, her primary motive for being sceptic in the first place. The second alternative seems in principle more promising in that respect. However, consider the following objection. As a matter of fact there are different ways to conceptualise the given, as for example, in terms of sense data and direct acquaintance, or in terms of Brentano's inner perception and itself-awareness². If it were self-evident from within a certain theory that what is given should be thus conceptualised, then how come there is so much disagreement on this issue among those accepting some theory of the given? Not to speak of the realist who seems unable to find any notion of the given to be given, 'given' any notion of the given. Presumably some of those realists have really understood most theories of the given, without finding any such notion self-evident. If the sceptic starts from b) she has similar problems to convince external world realists of the transparency of her notion, but also to convince sceptics who deliberately stipulate a theoretical notion of the given (alternative a)). The problem is not the disagreement but how to explain it without postulating that the notion involved is somehow theoretically motivated, that is, presupposes that the notion of the given is stipulated as a starting point for explanatory purposes. Again, that would undermine the assumption that what is given is a non-theoretical starting point in the argument against external world knowledge. The sceptic could bite the bullet and accept that her position is explanatory, but then she has to find another way to refute realism.

The preceding paragraph indicates that the sceptic position as argued from a notion of the given is unstable, since the very notion of the given is by itself a theoretically motivated notion, that is, transcends the given. Possibly this could be turned into an argument for the appropriateness of the inference pattern which is called 'inference from best explanation'. Assume that logical inference, induction, best explanation and direct knowledge from what is given, complete our list of, *prima facie*, acceptable ways to arrive at justified beliefs. Assume that there is no plausible idea of the given which is not theoretically motivated.

² Inner perception is the activity of every mental activity which makes us *aware* of that activity. It is not a higher order activity with a lower order activity as an object (introspection in Brentano's vocabulary, argued to be impossible since it gives rise to a regress of higher order states). Have a look in Brentano 1995, and you will be convinced that his notion is theoretically motivated and defined, indeed.

Then we are stuck with logical inference, induction, and theoretical virtues as *prima facie* candidates of justified procedures to arrive at beliefs. Inferences must be based on premises, and if no premises are given, they have to be theoretically motivated in some sense; hence theoretical virtues cannot be excluded from the list of justification-making properties. If this reasoning is sound, excluding theoretical virtues from the list of justification making properties, would leave us with no reason at all to believe in the outcome of any inference, whatever its kind, since there would be no premises to infer anything from. Moreover, it is questionable if on such a position, it would make sense to speak of inference patterns at all, a truly absurd version of intellectual suicide. The question is if that position is even coherent.

Let me say a few words about the dialectical relation between scepticism and naturalism. One way to refute scepticism takes the route through explanatory virtues. The natural sciences are often viewed as the paradigm of explanatory and methodological appropriateness. Brentano illustrates this point since he explicitly claims to adopt the methods of the natural sciences with the purpose to save philosophy from useless idealism and scepticism. We shall say that he advocates methodological naturalism, although it is an open question if his method actually accords with that of the natural sciences, whichever those might be. The issue of what constitutes a naturalistic position is complicated, which is illustrated by Brentano's attempt to naturalise philosophy. He claims to adopt certain methods in the same breath as he sets forth a theory explaining those methods, by way of intentionality, inner perception, external perception, external world causation, and so on. We should not forget that a methodological postulate of his was that we have the ability to know certain things about our own mental life directly and infallibly (through inner perception which he considered to be the 'empirical' foundation of psychology). Brentano might have objected that it is not a methodological postulate but an inner observational fact. But notice that the distinction between inner and outer perception depends on highly theoretical assumptions (not given) about intentionality and external world causal influence on the mind.

4. Mental causation and causal closure

We have seen that the kind of methodological naturalism suggested by e.g., Brentano can be combined with a realist account of the world and of real world knowledge by way of arguments from best explanation. Still, Brentano is a dualist concerning the mental and the physical. This gives rise to a well known metaphysical/explanatory problem, much discussed since Descartes famously claimed to have localized a causal nexus between the mental and the physical to a specific area in the brain (pineal gland). First, there is a general metaphysical worry concerned with how to understand the idea of a causal connection between physical stuff and mind stuff if these are separate ontological categories. Second and more relevant in this context is the causal closure assumption, accepted by most as being a commitment of our best physical theory. Papineau (1993) gives the following formulation of causal closure:

(CC) All physical effects have complete physical causes. (ibid. p. 22)

The causes of an effect are complete if they ‘suffice by physical law to fix the chances of those effects’. (ibid) Physics is a complete science in the sense ‘that all physical events are determined or have their chances determined, by prior physical events according to physical laws. (ibid p16) Hence, as Papineau observes CC follows directly from ‘the completeness of physics’ on most accounts of causality. The causal connection thesis can be given different formulations. Let’s consider a two way connection hypothesis, presumably something of the kind Descartes had in mind when he suggested the pineal gland as the place where the physical meets the mental. It says ‘what we have in mind (partly) causes what we do, that is, have physical effects, and the physical world (partly) causes what we have in mind’.

(CT) Some mental effects have physical causes and vice versa.

This formulation is not very precise as to which kind of correlation there is between causes and effects across the mental-physical boarder. On most notions of causality there must be some regularity in occurrences of types of causes and types of effects. At least, the same type of cause ‘must’ have the same type of effect. Call that ‘asymmetric regular correlation’.

If it is also true that the same type of effect ‘must’ have the same type of cause, it is a symmetric regular correlation. On the first condition, asymmetric correlation, we could say that certain types of effects supervene on certain types of causes (more than one type of cause regularly converges on the same type of effect). Supervenience is the weakest correlation constraint on most notions of causality. Presumably, it captures our intuition that a cause necessitates its effect (alternatively a certain probability of that effect); even so on regularity notions of causality, which reject the idea of a metaphysically necessary link between causes and effects.

5. Completeness of future physics

Now, there is a well known problem involved in accepting the conjunction of CT and CC, namely, that mentally caused physical effects will also have complete physical causes. If I intend to clean my windows and do so, then the physical courses of events which make my windows clean are completely explained by physical causes, but will also have my intention as a mental cause. This would mean that certain events are doubly caused by physical and mental events, that is, if mental causes (of physical effects) aren’t counted as a sub-class of physical phenomena.

To count mental phenomena among the physical can be justified in two ways. Either it is made reasonable to assume that mental phenomena are identical with known physical phenomena, or that they are identical with yet unknown physical phenomena. The first option comes in two forms, the type identity thesis and the token identity thesis. The latter is current fashion among causal role functionalists which identify mental properties with higher order (functional role) multiply realisable physical properties. The second alternative is harder to detail. Let’s say we get a new physics* counting today’s mental and physical phenomena, as physical* phenomena, subsuming them under one set of new physical categories and laws. Also, assume that CC is true for physics*. Under that assumption psychology and physics would be unified. Papineau identifies the history of theory change as good inductive reason to think that current physics will eventually be replaced by physics*. In a certain sense, such a replacement would indicate that current physics was

incomplete since physics* would recognize and explain physical effects, which current physics cannot account for. This raises a dilemma as to the epistemic evaluation of the conjunction of CC and CT. One way to get rid of double causation is to reject CC. Hence, we must ask ourselves what the rational reason to accept CC as true is. Since arguably, there is inductive evidence indicating that current physics is not complete, why not assume as a working hypothesis that mental causation could be what is missing in the equation?

Papineau does think there are good reasons to assume that future physics* will be complete, and moreover that it will not count primitive psychological features (presumably as we intuitively think of them today) to its list of basic physical* features. The question is, what would it mean to assume CC for physics* and what are the reasons for that assumption? Current physics explain physical effects in terms of energy, field and space-time structure (ibid p. 31). Papineau notices that we don't know what categories will count as physical*, a fortiori not what effects will count as physical* effects. Assume that physics* is allowed to count any explanatory categories and any effects as physical* if they are required for explanatory completeness. Papineau identifies a worry that this characterization of physics* would make it analytically true that physics* is complete. It should be noted that maybe there is no complete theory of everything. The world could be chaotic at some basic level. The case as described is therefore not completely empty. Anyway, if we look for something more than a definition of completeness of a unified theory of everything, an independent criterion is needed to identify the generic category of physical effects across current physics and physics*. Papineau suggests that we 'simply postulate paradigmatic physical effects, such as stones falling, the matter in our arms moving, and so on'. (ibid p. 30) The idea is simple. As long as a theory completely explains those effects (and presumably all non-paradigmatic effects as well) it is a complete physical (ambiguous) theory.

Papineau identifies a further worry. What if physics* recognizes primitive psychological categories, say consciousness or intentionality, in its explanations? This Papineau rejects as implausible on empirical grounds. His argument is that history shows (empirically) that paradigmatic physical effects have a certain kind of causes, (presumably physical causes). He doesn't specify the kind beyond the appeal to our intuitions, but

indicates that it is clear that it differs from all psychological categories. (ibid p. 31) What is at issue here? Papineau thinks that future physics will be complete, or better perhaps, that there is some physics*, which is complete and might be discovered by us. The reason for assuming it will be a future theory and not current is the history of theory change. But what is the reason to believe that any physics is complete? One could argue that any historical realization of physics by any scientific community, also of physics*, would have the same problem. They would have inductive reasons to the effect that their specific theory is not complete. But what would their reasons be that a future theory, say physics** would be complete or even that there exists some complete physics?

I don't find any real argument to that effect in Papineau's text, but there is maybe an indirect argument. An assumption is that the conjunction of CC and CT does not indicate that future physics will be incomplete, neither that it will be completed by way of including psychological categories. Of the latter alternative we could say that it would exemplify a complete unified theory of everything including physical categories as well as psychological. In that sense, physics* wouldn't be a pure physical theory. It would show that current physics was incomplete due to the fact that some physical effects had non-physical psychological causes. What are the reasons to assume this will not be the case? Roughly, Papineau's reason seems to be that physical theories have been changed to the better during our history but never by including psychological categories. Hence, it will probably not happen in the future. However, this is an argument to the effect that physics will not be completed by adding psychological categories, not an argument for completeness. Presumably, Papineau thinks that whatever categories except for mental that will be counted to that theory they will deserve to be called physical (generic sense). Let's grant that. Add the assumption that our history of improvements in accounting for physical effects in terms of physical causes indicates that there is a complete story in terms of causes and effects. This is not the inductive premise cited earlier, which is supposed to indicate that our current theory is not complete. It is something of the kind 'its getting better and better all the time (inductive), but at some point of improvement (hopefully realized at some future point in time) it stops, namely, when it is completed (the last clause about the end of inquiry is presumably not inductive)'. From this, partly inductively motivated, assumption in

combination with the inductively motivated assumption that theory improvements will never be made – since they never have been so before as a matter of empirical fact – by a psychological primitives being added, we might make the qualified guess that future physics will be complete, and not by way of psychological predicates being included.

Is this a good argument? It is too weak, since it could easily be turned upside down. A *prima facie* good reason for not believing the physics (of any time) to be complete is the belief that there are non-physical mental causes of physical effects. Why is that a good reason? Simply because there is at present no complete physical explanation of the mental, but there is evidence for CT. However, there is also a strong *prima facie* reason to believe in the completeness of physics, namely, that we have no physical evidence that mental causation crosses with physical causation in producing physical effects. We have no laboratory evidence of physical events mentally caused, which are not behaving in accordance with physical laws. In other words, the completeness of physics is a working hypothesis not yet falsified by observations of any mental causation. Our only evidence of mental causation comes from what appears to be our reasonably successful application of psychological explanations which involves mental causation. How should these observations be combined? If physics is complete a nice solution would consist in showing the mental to be reducible to the physical. As everyone knows this cannot be accomplished in an afternoon; hence this is also future science. Moreover, Papineau directs our attention to inductive evidence that current physics probably isn't complete after all. What are the relative weights of each one of these observations? If you wish to turn Papineau on his head you could just put more weight on the problems involved in the reductive project and add to that his cited evidence that current physics isn't complete. You could interpret theory history as a failure in recognizing the importance of psychological properties by citing the notorious problems to reduce the mental to the physical and the historical evidence for the incompleteness of current physics. You could argue that it is reasonable to assume that no future physics will be complete.

What is the moral? To me this indicates that we should stay away from mixing meta-theoretical issues concerned with inductive evidence (whatever that is taken to be) for the completeness of future physics with scientific questions concerned with current evidence

counting for CC and CT respectively. The scientific question is: can we unify psychology and physics by showing that psychological properties are at root physical properties. This issue is urgent since we, as mentioned above, have some kind of evidence for CC and CT independently, although circumscribed by a lot of theoretical assumptions and historical evidence to the contrary. The moral is simply that we should stick to current assumptions and current theories. We should try to reduce psychology to physics or biology or whatever, but not try to make it reasonable that future physics will be complete. The only reason to do such a thing would be that the new physics was around the corner, and the old proved to be incomplete, not inductively but on current evidence. We don't know that physics is complete but we have good reasons to hold it as a working hypothesis (this might very well be false due to certain problems to unify Einstein's general theory of relativity with quantum mechanics, but that is another story). We don't have to prove that it must be true for some future physics before we have found out if it is true for our physics.

Let me summarize. From best scientific explanation a causal connection was assumed to hold between the mental and the physical, a step towards methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism can easily be combined with a dualist causal connection hypothesis in an account of real world knowledge, and of intentional behaviour where the mental seems to have physical effects. Scepticism is thus refuted. This is the first step dialectically speaking, via causal closure and metaphysical worries towards the search for metaphysical reduction of the mental to the physical. CT is a rough commonsense formulation of the connection between mind and physical matter. On the dualist perspective, CT and the completeness of physics (hence CC) certain physical events turn out to be causally overdetermined. By rejecting metaphysical dualism, hopefully the problem with causal overdetermination can be avoided. This last assumption captures what is known as physicalism, and is also connected with what is sometimes called 'ontological naturalism' or 'reductive naturalism'. Finally, Papineau's arguments from future physics for the completeness of a purely physical theory, that is, a theory which does not include psychological notions, are too weak. I don't know of any good argument from future physics. Nevertheless, reductive naturalism is a reasonable working hypothesis supported by some evidence, although restrictedly so, due to certain facts which could be interpreted as

evidence for the opposite being true. Also, it could be the case that some theoretical notion of the given turns out to be our best choice, but we haven't seen it yet.

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