ABSTRACT
The precautionary principle (PP) has been criticised for almost every
intellectual sin one may imagine: unclarity, impracticability,
rigidity, implausibility etc. Recognising the rather obvious fact that
there is no such thing as one PP, this paper attempts to address this
criticism on a more constructive note than merely view it as forcing us
to be "for or against" precaution. This is done by connecting an
underlying ethical ideal regarding the imposition of risks present in
most formulations of PP to the criticism and use the latter for
discussing how such an idea may be plausibly designed and used for
underpinning policies that may plausibly be said to express the spirit
of PP. It is argued that the most important issue regarding this is to
recognise that there is something to the idea that imposing risks on
people has a morally significant price, but that we must also
acknowledge that taking precautionary measures to avoid or decrease
such risks has such a price. The critical issue in the ethics of risk
of relevance for PP thus becomes what constitutes a proper price of
precaution. It is demonstrated how two simple constraints on this amkes
it easy to meet many typical arguments against PP, but also how this
issue must be further attacked by means transcending the traditional
tools of normative ethics and decision theory, as well as how further
reflection along such lines connects PP to issues of international BACK to the bibliography