ABSTRACT
The phenomenon of twinning in early fetal development has become a
popular source for doubt regarding the ascription of moral status to early
embryos. In this paper, the possible moral basis for such a line of reasoning
is critically analysed with sceptical results. Three different versions
of the argument from twinning are considered, all of which are found to
rest on confusions between the actual division of embryos involed in twinning
and the property of early embryos to be divisible, be based on highly questionable
ethical assumptions, or to imply inconsistent claims regarding the moral
importance of potentiality and/or the moral status of embryos. This is
taken to expose a number of related inconsistencies in the moral basis
of pro-life positions. In particular, ascribing moral significance to the
property of being (in)divisible is found to be incompatible with the claim
that human individuals possess unique values which could underpin an absolute
moral ban on murder.
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